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Published & Forthcoming Papers
You can find more details on these papers using the links below.

I argue that, even if it turns out that most people's lives are not good for them, it would still be permissible to create new people, roughly because we are often in a position to predict that new people will be glad to have been created.

I defend Timothy Sprigge's claim that there are necessary connections between our phenomenology and our attitudes, and I argue that this dissolves an important debate between subjectivists and objectivists about value.

We argue that attitudinal theorists must either accept that pleasantness can come radically apart from phenomenology, or else give up their main objection to their main rival: the phenomenological theory.

I argue that desire's significance for well-being is derived from a pair of more fundamental attitudes—attraction and aversion—which  have purely positive and purely negative significance for well-being, respectively.

When we differ in tastes, do our experiences differ with respect to what it's like to experience them? I argue “yes”, and show why the answer matters for debates in the philosophy of mind and value.

According to the leading theories of pleasure in ethics, the pleasantness of our experiences is determined by either their phenomenology or our attitudes towards them. I critically examine the field of possible hybrid views, and defend the view that pleasures are experiences which motivate certain attitudes in virtue of their phenomenology.

Humeans are committed to the thesis that for any causal facts pertaining to a region, those facts pertain to that region extrinsically. I show that—despite their efforts—Humeans cannot escape this (problematic) commitment.

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