Published & Forthcoming Papers
You can find more details on these paper using the links below.
Attraction, Aversion, and Asymmetrical Desire — in Ethics (final version in progress)
I argue that desire's significance for well-being is derived from a pair of more fundamental attitudes—attraction and aversion—with differing significance for well-being.
The Pleasure Problem and the Spriggean Solution — in Journal of the American Philosophical Association

I defend Sprigge's claim that there are necessary connections between our phenomenology and our attitudes, and I argue that this dissolves an important debate between subjectivists and objectivists.

How Do We Differ When We Differ in Tastes? — in Ergo

When we differ in tastes, do our experiences differ phenomenologically? I argue “yes”, and show why the answer matters for debates in the philosophy of mind and value.

An Honest Look at Hybrid Theories of Pleasurein Philosophical Studies

According to the leading theories of pleasure in ethics, the pleasantness of our experiences is determined by either their phenomenology or our attitudes towards them. I critically examine a hybrid approach.

Why Humean Causation is Extrinsic — in Thought

Humeans are committed to the thesis that for any causal facts pertaining to a region, those facts pertain to that region extrinsically. I show why Humeans cannot escape this (problematic) commitment.

Papers in Progress

Please feel free to email me if you're interested in reading a draft!

Attraction, Aversion, and Asymmetrical Desire — Accepted to Ethics, final version in progress
I argue that desire's significance for well-being is derived from a pair of more fundamental attitudes—attraction and aversion—with differing significance for well-being.
A New Hedonism

I develop and defend a non-standard kind of hedonism: explanatory hedonism. According to this view, all facts about well-being are explained by facts about pleasure. However, pleasure is not the only good.

 
Doubting the Attitudinal Theory of Pleasure (with Alex Dietz)

We argue that attitudinal theorists must either accept that pleasantness can come radically apart from pleasure, or else give up their main objection to their main rival: the phenomenological theory.

The Ambiguity of Mental Commands

In recent years, a number of philosophers have argued that pains have imperatival contents. But they disagree about what pains command us to do. I argue that the matter cannot be settled via. introspection.

Upcoming Projects

Robot Minds and Nomological Behaviorism

I argue that we should accept nomological behaviorism as a working theory. We should assume that, as a matter of at least nomological necessity, creatures are mentally alike if they are behaviorally alike. This does not entail that conscious robots exist now, though it suggests that they may exist soon.

What Descriptive States Can Do

I defend the view that moral judgments could motivate us even if they are "belief-like", rather than "desire-like", and even in the absence of a relevantly related "desire-like" state.

Bad Lives Worth Living

I argue that, even if it turns out that most people's lives are not good for them, it would still be permissible to create new people.

Mill's Desirability Argument Revisited  (with Jennifer Foster)

We provide a new, abductive interpretation of Mill’s argument for utilitarianism. We show that Mill’s argument, thus interpreted, is both independently compelling and immune to Moore’s criticisms.