Published Papers — You can find more details on these paper using the links below.
How Do We Differ When We Differ in Tastes? (Link)
When we differ in tastes, do our experiences differ phenomenologically? I argue “yes”, and show why the answer matters for debates in the philosophy of mind and value.
An Honest Look at Hybrid Theories of Pleasure (Link)
According to the leading theories of pleasure in ethics, the pleasantness of our experiences is determined by either their phenomenology or our attitudes towards them. I critically examine a hybrid approach.
Why Humean Causation is Extrinsic (Link)
Humeans are committed to the thesis that for any causal facts pertaining to a region, those facts pertain to that region extrinsically. I show why Humeans cannot escape this (apparently problematic) commitment.
Papers in Progress — Please feel free to email me if you're interested in reading a draft.
A New Hedonism
I develop and defend a non-standard kind of hedonism: explanatory hedonism. According to this view, all facts about well-being are explained by facts about pleasure. However, pleasure is not the only good.
How to Reconcile Objectivism and Subjectivism about Experiential Value
I argue that there are necessary connections between our phenomenology and our attitudes, and I argue that this result dissolves an important debate between subjectivists and objectivists.
Positive and Negative Desire
I argue that desire's significance for well-being is derived from a pair of more fundamental attitudes—attraction and aversion—with differing significance for well-being.
Doubting the Attitudinal Theory of Pleasure (with Alex Dietz)
We argue that attitudinal theorists must either accept that pleasantness can come radically apart from pleasure, or else give up their main objection to their main rival: the phenomenological theory.
The Ambiguity of Mental Commands
In recent years, a number of philosophers have argued that pains have imperatival contents. But they disagree about what pains command us to do. I argue that the matter cannot be settled via. introspection.
The Expansive Role of Pleasure in Well-Being
I argue that, on a plausible Spriggean theory of pleasure, our pleasures play a role in the good life which is typically attributed to desire. Pleasures can be “satisfied”, and their satisfaction is good for us.
Bad Lives Worth Living
I examine the claim that most people have negative well-being. I argue that the truth of this claim would solve persistent puzzles in population ethics. And I argue that having negative well-being isn’t a disaster.
Mill's Desirability Argument Revisited (with Jennifer Foster)
We provide a new, abductive interpretation of Mill’s argument for utilitarianism. We show that Mill’s argument, thus interpreted, is both independently compelling and immune to Moore’s criticisms.